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ABSTRACT
What is the likelihood that the U.S. will experience a devastating catastrophic event over the next few
decades that would substantially reduce the capital stock, GDP and wealth? Can the probability and
possible impact of such an event be inferred from economic data? And how much should society be
willing to pay to reduce the probability or impact of a catastrophe? We address these questions using
a general equilibrium model that describes production, capital accumulation, and household preferences,
and includes the possible arrival of catastrophic shocks. Calibrating to economic and financial data
shows the annual mean arrival rate of shocks to be about 1.5% and the expected loss from a shock
to be about 30%. We use the model to calculate the tax on consumption society would accept to reduce
the probability of a shock, and the cost to insure against its actual impact.
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What is the likelihood that the U.S. will experience a devastating catastrophic event over
the next few decades? Can the probability and possible impact of such an event be inferred
from the behavior of economic variables such as investment, interest rates, and equity prices?
And how much should society be willing to pay to reduce the probability or likely impact of
a catastrophic event, or to insure against its actual impact should it occur?
By “catastrophic event,” we mean something national or global in scale that would sub-
stantially reduce the capital stock and/or the productive eﬃciency of capital, thereby sub-
stantially reducing GDP, consumption, and wealth. Examples that we have in mind (you can
come up with your own) include a nuclear or biological terrorist attack (far worse than even
9/11), a highly contagious “mega-virus” that spreads uncontrollably, a global environmental
disaster, or a ﬁnancial and economic crisis on the order of the Great Depression. Unlike
more locally contained events such as Hurricane Katrina or the Asian tsunami, as terrible as
they were, the events of concern to us would destroy part of the country’s (or the world’s)
physical and/or human capital and raise future costs of operating the remaining capital.1
Our approach to analyzing the economics of catastrophes diﬀers considerably from the
existing literature. We do not try to estimate the mean arrival rate and impact distribution
of catastrophic events from historical data, nor do we use the estimates of others. Instead,
we develop an equilibrium model of the economy and estimate these characteristics as a cal-
ibration output of our analysis. In eﬀect, we are assuming that the calibrated characteristics
of catastrophes are those perceived by ﬁrms and households, in that they are consistent with
behavior, and thus with the data for key economic variables.2
Behavioral reactions to possible catastrophic events depend in part on preferences. Like
1Those readers who are incurable optimists and/or have limited imaginations should read Posner (2004),
who provides additional examples and argues that society fails to take these risks suﬃciently seriously, and
Sunstein (2007). For a sobering discussion of the likelihood and possible impact of nuclear terrorism, see
Allison (2004). In an excellent review article of Posner’s book, Parson (2007) points out the need for a
general cost-beneﬁt framework to address these risks in a consistent way.
2In related work, Russett and Slemrod (1993) used survey data to show how beliefs about the likelihood
of nuclear war aﬀected savings behavior, and argue that such beliefs can help explain the low propensity to
save in the U.S. relative to other countries. Also, see Slemrod (1990) and Russett and Lackey (1987).
1some other recent studies, we assume that households have recursive preferences, which
involve three behavioral parameters: the rate of time preference, the index of relative risk
aversion, and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. There is little agreement among
economists regarding the “correct” values for these parameters, but our calibration exercise
provides insight into their plausible ranges and relative magnitudes.
We specify an AK model of production more general than those used by others in that it
includes adjustment costs, so consumption and investment goods are not freely interchange-
able and Tobin’s q can exceed one. Adjustment costs are crucial, and enable us to generate
endogenous consumption-investment and consumption-wealth ratios that match U.S. data.
We model catastrophes as Poisson events with some mean arrival rate, and an impact
characterized by a one-parameter power probability distribution. Thus the characteristics of
catastrophes are captured by two parameters. Leaving these two parameters unconstrained,
we calibrate our model to ﬁt post-war U.S. data for productivity, the consumption-investment
ratio, the risk-free interest rate, the equity premium, Tobin’s q, and the average real growth
rate. We thereby calculate the implied characteristics of catastrophes, and also determine
how those characteristics depend on preference parameters.3 In addition, our model yields
the equilibrium price of catastrophe insurance that would prevail in a market for risk trading,
and to our knowledge is the ﬁrst to do so for a production economy.
We ﬁnd the mean annual arrival rate of catastrophes to be about .015, with a possible
range (based on our sensitivity analysis) of .005 to .027. This range is fairly narrow given
that catastrophes are indeed “rare” events. We also ﬁnd that conditional on the index of
risk aversion, the expected loss from a catastrophe is about 17 to 30 percent of the capital
stock. Finally, our results yield information about the values of behavioral parameters. In
particular, we provide evidence that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is below 0.5.
We use our calibrated model to address the third question that we raised at the outset:
How much should society be willing to pay to reduce the probability or likely impact of a
3A more general version of the model would allowthe impact of a catastrophe to be temporary by assuming
that following an initial drop, productivity mean-reverts to its original level. This would introduce a third
parameter to the characterization of catastrophes — the rate of mean reversion. The three catastrophe
parameters could still be calculated as an output of the model’s calibration.
2catastrophic event? We calculate a tax-based measure of “willingness to pay” (WTP). In
our model a permanent tax on consumption is non-distortionary, equivalent to a lump-sum
tax, and equivalent to a reduction in the current capital stock by an amount equal to the
tax rate. Thus our WTP is the permanent percentage tax rate that society should be willing
to accept in order to reduce the mean arrival rate of a catastrophic event from its calibrated
value to a lower value. This approach lets us avoid estimating the cost of reducing the mean
arrival rate, which is presumably a convex function of the size of the reduction.
The questions we address have been the focus of a growing literature, the roots of which
go back to the observation by Rietz (1988) that low-probability catastrophes might explain
the equity premium puzzle ﬁrst noted by Mehra and Prescott (1985), i.e., could help reconcile
a relatively large equity premium (5 to 7%) and low real risk-free rate of interest (0 to 2%)
with moderate risk aversion on the part of households. Rietz’s article receivedlittle attention
until the recent work of Barro (2006, 2009) and Weitzman (2007). Barro (2006) assembled
data on “consumption disasters,” deﬁned as reductions in real GDP of 15% or more, for a
panel of 35 countries over the past century. He estimated the Poisson arrival rate of such
events (just under 2% per year) and the distribution of the drop in GDP. Using a pure
exchange model of the economy similar to that of Rietz, Barro showed that these numbers
are roughly consistent with the observed equity premium and real risk-free rate in the U.S.4
Barro (2009) extended his earlier work by generalizing his model to include an AK pro-
duction technology and Epstein-Weil-Zin (EWZ) recursive preferences, thereby endogenizing
savings and investment and disentangling the index of risk aversion from the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution. Using his earlier estimates of the mean arrival rate and loss impact
distribution of catastrophes, the model could again match the observed equity premium and
risk-free rate. However, the model’s calibration is inconsistent with other basic economic
variables. For example, it predicts a consumption-investment ratio of about 1:3, instead
of matching the roughly 3:1 ratio in the data. Also, because consumption and investment
4Concurrently, Weitzman (2007) showed that the equity premium and real risk-free rate puzzles could
be explained by “structural uncertainty” in which one or more key parameters, such as the true variance of
equity returns, is estimated through Bayesian updating.
3goods are freely interchangable in his model, Tobin’s q is (unrealistically) always one.
Several authors have extended Barro’s work. Gourio (2008) used an exchange economy
model with recursive preferences but allowed disasters to have limited duration. He found
that the eﬀect of recoveries on the equity premium could be positive or negative, depending
on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Gabaix (2008) and Wachter (2008) showed
that a time-varying Poisson arrival rate could explain the high volatility of the stock market
(in addition to the equity premium and real risk-free rate).
Other studies have sought improved estimates of the event arrival rate and impact. For
example, Barro and Urs´ ua (2008) exploit an extended dataset based on consumption instead
of GDP, and Barro, Nakamura, Steinsson, and Urs´ ua (2009) estimate a more general model
that accounts for recoveries. While these studies provide a better understanding of the
characteristics of historical “consumption disasters,” they are limited in two respects. First,
many of the included disasters are manifestations of three global events — the two World
Wars and the Great Depression. Second, the possible catastrophic events that we think
are of greatest interest today have little or no historical precedent — there are no data, for
example, on the frequency or impact of nuclear or biological terrorist attacks.
Consider the forty-year period beginning around 1950 and ending with the breakup of the
Soviet Union. During that time there was one potential catastrophic event that dominated all
others: the possibility of nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The fear of such
of an event was based partly on the possibility of a mistake: One side might see something
threatening on a radar screen, and, unable to get suﬃcient reassurance from a phone call,
launch its own missiles. What was the likelihood of such an event and the probability
distribution for its impact? Although the Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation,
and others did studies to address these questions, there was no historical precedent on which
to base estimates. Thus we take a very diﬀerent approach and ask what event arrival rate
and impact distribution are implied by basic economic data.
In the next section we lay out a general equilibrium model that incorporates catastrophic
shocks, discuss its solution, and explain how its calibration yields information about shocks.
Section 3 shows calibration results, and discusses their implications for the nature of catas-
4trophic shocks, and for household preferences. Section 4 discusses our application of the
model to policy analysis, and in particular, the calculation of WTP. Section 5 concludes.
2 Framework.
We construct a general equilibrium model in which: (i) a representative consumer has re-
cursive preferences; (ii) output is given by an AK technology; (iii) investment involves ad-
justment costs reﬂecting the expense and time needed to install capital, so q 6= 1; (iv)
catastrophic shocks are Poisson arrivals, and cause the loss of a random fraction of the
capital stock. Despite its generality, the model yields closed-form solutions for equilibrium
allocations and pricing.
2.1 Building Blocks.
Preferences. We use the Duﬃe and Epstein (1992) continuous-time version of EWZ pref-
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Here ρ is the rate of time preference, ψ the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), γ
the coeﬃcient of relativerisk aversion, and ω = (1−ψ−1)/(1−γ). Unliketime-additiveutility,
recursive preferences separate risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.5
Note that if γ = ψ−1 so that ω = 1, we have the standard constant-relative-risk-aversion





One of the questions we address is whether γ is close to ψ−1, so that the simple CRRA utility
function is a reasonable approximation for modeling purposes. In particular, we examine how
5Note that the marginal beneﬁt of consumption is fC = ρC−ψ−1/[(1−γ)V ]ω−1, which depends not only
on current consumption but also (through V ) on the expected trajectory of future consumption.
5equilibrium allocation and pricing constrains the model’s parameters, including the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution and index of risk aversion.
Production. Aggregate output has an AK production technology:
Y = AK , (4)
where A is a constant. Here K is the total stock of capital; it includes physical capital as
traditionally measured, but also human capital and ﬁrm-based intangible capital.
Catastrophic Shocks. We model catastrophic shocks as Poisson arrivals with mean
arrival rate λ. There is no limit to the number of catastrophic shocks; the occurrence of a
shock does not change the likelihood of another.6 When a catastrophic shock does occur,
it permanently destroys a stochastic fraction (1 − Z) of the capital stock K, where the
remaining fraction, Z, follows a well-behaved probability density function (pdf) ζ(Z) with
0 ≤ Z ≤ 1. By well-behaved, we mean that the moments E(Zn) exist for n = 1, 1 − γ, and
−γ. As we will see, these are the only moments of Z that are relevant for our analysis.
Investment and Capital Accumulation. Letting I denote aggregate investment, the
capital stock K evolves as:
dKt = Φ(It,Kt)dt + σKtdWt − (1 − Z)KtdJt . (5)
Here the parameter σ captures diﬀusion volatility,Wt is a standard Brownian motion process,
and Jt is a jump process with mean arrival rate λ that captures catastrophic events; if a
jump occurs, K falls by the random fraction (1−Z). The adjustment cost function Φ(I,K)
captures eﬀects of depreciation and costs of installing capital and making it productive. We
assume Φ(I,K) is homogeneous of degree one in I and K and thus can be written as:
Φ(I,K) = φ(i)K , (6)
6Shocks to capital have been widely used in the growth literature with an AK technology, but unlike the
existing literature, we examine the economic eﬀects of shocks to capital that involve discrete (catastrophic)
jumps. See Jones and Manuelli (2005) for a survey of endogenous growth models with with stochastic AK
technology, and Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000) for a related study of the role of investment-speciﬁc
technological change over business cycles.
6where i = I/K and φ(i) is increasing and concave. Unlike other models of catastrophes, we
explicitly account for the eﬀects of adjustment costs on equilibrium price and quantities.7
2.2 Equilibrium.
Our recursive formulation of the economy requires that markets are eﬀectively complete,
which can be achieved via dynamic trading. The following securities are therefore needed at
each point in time: (i) a risk-free asset, (ii) a tradeable claim on the value of capital of the
representative ﬁrm, and (iii) insurance claims for catastrophes with every possible recovery
fraction Z. Because our model allows for catastrophic jumps in the capital stock (unlike
typical production-based equilibrium models), market completeness requires that agents can
trade insurance claims on every possible catastrophic event with recovery fraction Z.
Catastrophic Risk Insurance. Catastrophic risk can be traded through the use of
catastrophic insurance swaps (CIS), deﬁned as follows. A CIS for the survival fraction in the
interval (Z,Z + dZ) is a swap contract in which the buyer makes a continuum of payments
p(Z)dZ to the seller and in exchange receives a lump-sum payoﬀ if and only if a catastrophe
with survival fraction in (Z,Z +dZ) occurs. That is, the buyer stops paying the seller if and
only if the deﬁned catastrophic event occurs and collects one unit of the consumption good
as a payoﬀ from the seller. Note the close analogy between our CIS and the widely used
credit default swap (CDS) contracts. Unlike the pricing models for CDS contracts, ours is a
general equilibrium model with an endogenously determined risk premium.
Competitive Equilibrium. We deﬁne the recursive competitive equilibrium as follows:
(1) The representative consumer dynamically chooses investments in the risk-free asset, risky
equity, and various CIS claims to maximize utility deﬁned in (1) by taking the equilibrium
prices of all assets and investment/consumption goods as given. (2) The ﬁrm maximizes its
market value, which is the present discounted value of future cash ﬂows, using the equilibrium
stochastic discount factor. (3) All markets clear. In particular, (i) the net supply of the risk-
7Homogeneous adjustment cost functions are analytically tractable and have been widely used in the
investment/q-theory literature. Hayashi (1982) showed that with homogenous adjustment costs and perfect
capital markets, marginal and average q are equal. Jermann (1998) integrates this type of adjustment costs
into an equilibrium business cycle/asset pricing model.
7free asset is zero; (ii) the demand for the claim to the representative ﬁrm is equal to unity,
the normalized aggregate supply; (iii) the net demand for the CIS of each possible recovery
fraction Z is zero; and (iv) the goods market clears, i.e., It = Yt − Ct at all t ≥ 0.
These market-clearingconditions are standard in the equilibriumpricingliterature. When
all markets are available for trading by investors and ﬁrms, the prices of claims such as the
risk-free asset and CIS claims are at levels implying zero demand in equilibrium. With
these conditions, we can invoke the welfare theorem to solve the social planner’s problem
and obtain the competitive equilibrium allocation, and then use the representative agent’s
marginal utility to price all assets in the economy. We emphasize that CIS insurance markets
are crucial to dynamically complete the markets. This is a fundamental diﬀerence from
models based purely on diﬀusion processes without catastrophic risk.
In the next section, we summarize the solution of the model via the social planner’s
problem, leaving the details of the solution to Appendix A. In Appendix B, we derive the
decentralized competitive market equilibrium and show that it yields the same solution.
2.3 Model Solution via the Social Planner’s Problem.
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where V (K) is the value function and the expectation is with respect to the density function
ζ(Z) for the survival fraction Z. We have the following ﬁrst-order condition for I:
fC(C,V ) = φ
0(i)V
0(K) . (8)
The left-hand side of eqn. (8) is the marginal beneﬁt of consumption and the right-hand side
is its marginal cost, which equals the marginal value of capital V 0(K) times the marginal
eﬃciency of converting a unit of the consumption good into a unit of capital, φ0(i).






8where b is a coeﬃcient determined as part of the solution. Let c = C/K = A−i. (Lower-case
letters in this paper express quantities relative to the capital stock K.) Appendix A shows
that b is related to the equilibrium level of investment by:








For clarity, we have made the dependence of b on the catastrophe likelihood λ explicit by
denoting it as b(λ). The key determinant of b is the equilibrium investment-capital ratio i∗,
which solves the following non-linear equation:




















Note that in equilibrium, the optimal investment-capital ratio I/K = i∗ is constant.
Consider the special case of no adjustment costs as in Barro (2009), for which our adjust-
ment cost function becomes linear and is given by φ(i) = i − δ, where δ can be interpreted
as the expected rate of stochastic depreciation. It is straightforward to show that
i = δ + ψ
"















Investment in this special case depends on A − δ − ρ. Thus the introduction of adjustment
costs in our model lets us separate the eﬀects of A from those of δ and the subjective discount
rate ρ, in addition to generating rents for capital with q 6= 1.
Equilibrium capital accumulation in our model is given by:
dKt/Kt = φ(i
∗)dt + σdWt − (1 − Z)dJt , (13)
where i∗ is the solution of eqn. (11). Let g denote the expected growth rate (conditional on
no catastrophic shocks), i.e., g = φ(i∗). The expected growth rate inclusive of catastrophes
is then φ(i∗) − λE(1 − Z), where the second term is the expected downward adjustment of
capital stock growth due to possible catastrophes.
We show in the Appendix that the solution to the social planner’s problem can be de-
centralized via the goods-market clearing condition and two ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC) for
the consumer and the producer:























Eqn. (14) is simply an accounting identity that equates saving and investment. Eqn. (15)
is a ﬁrst-order condition for producers. Re-writing it as φ0(i)q = 1, it equates the marginal
beneﬁt of an extra unit of investment (which at the margin yields φ0(i) units of capital, each
of which is worth q) with its marginal opportunity cost (1 unit of the consumption good).
Similarly, eqn. (16) is a ﬁrst-order condition for consumers. It equates consumption
(normalized by the capital stock) to the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of
wealth (everything in the square brackets) times q, the marginal value of a unit of capital.
Note that the entire capital stock is marketable and its value is qK. What drives the MPC,
c/q? Looking inside the square brackets, if ψ = 1, wealth and substitution eﬀects just oﬀset
each other, and c/q = ρ, the rate of time preference. More generally, if ψ < 1, the wealth
eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect, and hence the MPC increases with the growth
rate g and decreases with risk aversion and volatility. The opposite holds if ψ > 1.
This equilibriumresource allocation has the following pricing implications for the risk-free
asset, the equity claim, and the CIS claims.































Eqn. (17) for the interest rate r is a generalized Ramsey rule. If ψ−1 = γ so that
preferences simplify to CRRA expected utility, and if there were no stochastic changes in
K, the deterministic Ramsey rule r = ρ + γg would hold. The third term captures the
precautionary savings eﬀect under recursive preferences of continuous stochastic ﬂuctuations
in K, and the remainder adjusts for catastrophic risk. Note that the ﬁrst term in the square
brackets is the reduction in the interest rate due to catastrophic risk under expected utility
(and does not depend on ψ). The second term gives the additional eﬀects of catastrophic
10risk for non-expected utility; when ψ−1 > γ, catastrophic risk further lowers the equilibrium
interest rate from the level implied by standard CRRA utility.
Eqn. (18) describes the equity risk premium, rp. The ﬁrst term on the RHS is the usual
risk premium in diﬀusion models (see, e.g., Breeden(1979) and Lucas (1978)), and the second
term is the increase in the premium due to jumps in K. When a jump occurs, (1−Z) is the
fraction of loss, and (Z−γ − 1) is the percentage increase in marginal utility from that loss,
i.e., the price of risk. The jump component of the equity risk premium is given by λ times
the expectation of the product of these two random variables. Note that the fraction of loss
and the increase of marginal utility are positively correlated, which substantially contributes
to the risk premium. (In the limiting case where the loss is close to 100%, the increase in
marginal utility approaches inﬁnity.) Also note that the risk premium depends only on the
index of risk aversion, and does not depend on the EIS or rate of time preference.
Finally, eqn. (19) gives the stream of payments that the CIS buyer must make to insure
against a catastrophe with loss fraction (1 − Z); should that catastrophe occur, the buyer
would receive one unit of the consumption good. Not surprisingly, the higher the arrival rate
of a catastrophe with survival fraction Z, λζ(Z), the higher the corresponding CIS payment.
The multiplier Z−γ in eqn. (19) measures the insurance risk premium; the higher is γ and
the bigger is the loss (the lower is Z), the more expensive is the insurance.
3 Calibration.
In this section we explainour calibration procedure, including the distributionfor the survival
fraction Z, and describe the data for the model’s inputs. We present a baseline calibration
and then do additional sensitivity calibrations. Lastly, we turn to the role of adjustment
costs and compare our results with those of Barro (2009). This helps to show the importance
of adjustment costs and the implications of certain parameter choices.
First, note that obtaining the probability and impact distribution of catastrophes as a
calibration output as we do is similar to the earlier pioneering approach of Rietz (1988).8
8Rietz used the Great Depression as a reference point for arguing for the plausibility of his calibration,
11Unike Rietz, our list of target moments goes beyond the equity premium and risk-free rate.9
3.1 The Distribution for Shocks.
The solution of the model presented above applies to any well-behaved distribution for
recovery Z. We assume that Z follows a power distribution over (0,1) with parameter α > 0:
ζ(Z) = αZ
α−1 ; 0 ≤ Z ≤ 1 , (20)
so that E(Z) = α/(α + 1). Thus a large value of α implies a small expected loss E(1 − Z).
The distribution given by eqn. (20) is general. If α = 1, Z follows a uniform distribu-
tion. For any α > 0, eqn. (20) implies that −lnZ is exponentially distributed with mean
E(−lnZ) = 1/α. Eqn. (20) also implies that the inverse of the remaining fraction of the
capital stock follows a Pareto distribution with density function α(1/Z)−α−1 , (1/Z) > 1.
The Pareto distribution is fat-tailed and often used to model extreme events.
The power distribution for Z given in (20) simpliﬁes the solution of the model. We need
three moments of Z, namely E(Zn) where n = 1, 1 − γ, and −γ. Eqn. (20) implies
E(Z
n) = α/(α + n) , (21)
provided that α + n > 0. Since the smallest relevant value of n is −γ, we require α > γ,
which ensures that the expected impact of a catastrophe is suﬃciently limited so that the
model admits an interior solution for any level of risk aversion γ. Thus E(1−Z) = 1/(α+1)
is the expected loss if an event occurs, and E(Z−γ−1) = γ/(α−γ) is the expected percentage
increase in marginal utility from the loss; both are decreasing in α.
Using eqn. (21), we can rewrite eqns. (16), (17), and (18) as:
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(22)
but did not estimate the parameters of the disaster distribution. Instead he considered a range that produced
reasonable values for the equity premium and the risk-free rate, given the other parameters of his model.
9The eﬀort by Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursua (2008) to obtain independent evidence on the probability
and size of disasters attempts to respond to a main criticism of Rietz (1988), namely that the disasters
assumed in his model are too large to be plausible. See also Mehra and Prescott (1988) and more recently
the discussion by Constantinides (2008).
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To calibrate the model we want data covering a time period that is long but relatively stable
and free of signiﬁcant catastrophic events. We therefore use data for the U.S. economy for
1947 to 2008 (except for Tobin’s q) to construct average values of the output-capital ratio
Y/K, the consumption-investment ratio c/i, Tobin’s average q, the real risk-free interest
rate r, the equity risk premium rp, the average real growth rate g (without accounting for
catastrophes), and the diﬀusion volatility σ. As discussed in Appendix D, our measure of
the capital stock includes physical capital, estimates of human capital, and estimates of ﬁrm-
based intangible capital (e.g., patents, know-how, brand value, and organizational capital).
Thus we obtain a measure of the productivity parameter A = Y/K consistent with the AK
production technology of eqn. (4). Likewise, our measure of investment (and GDP) includes
investment in ﬁrm-based intangible capital. Unless otherwise noted, all rates are annual.
Our value of q comes from estimates by Riddick and Whited (2010), who used ﬁrm-
level Compustat data for 1972 to 2006. With measurement errors and heterogeneous ﬁrms,
averaging ﬁrm-level data provides a more economically sensible estimate for the q of the
representative ﬁrm than inferring q from aggregate data. In particular, the ﬁrm-level q is
more naturally linked to optimal investment by a representative ﬁrm, which is the micro-
foundation for our model. Averaging the Riddick and Whited estimates across ﬁrms and
years yields a value of 1.43 for q, which is the number we use in our baseline calibration.10
A detailed discussion of our calibration inputs, including sources of data, is in Appendix D.
10Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent (2009) also estimate q from ﬁrm-level data, but for the period 1981–2003,
and for a panel restricted to large ﬁrms (the top quartile of ﬁrms in the Computstat data). Their average q
is lower, only 1.3, but that is due to their exclusion of smaller ﬁrms, which tend to have higher q’s.
13Table 1: Summary of Baseline Calibration
Calibration inputs Symbol Value Calibration outputs Symbol Value
(Annual rates)
output-capital ratio A 0.113 EIS ψ 0.181
consumption-investment ratio c/i 2.84 mean arrival rate λ 0.015
real growth rate (no shocks) g 0.02 distribution parameter α 2.374
diﬀusion volatility σ 0.025 expected loss E(1 − Z) 0.296
average q q 1.43
risk-free interest rate r 0.008
equity risk premium rp 0.066
rate of time preference ρ 0.02
index of risk aversion γ 2
We also need values for two behavioral parameters, the index of risk aversion γ and the
rate of time preference ρ. Numbers for γ used in the ﬁnance and macroeconomics literature
cover a wide range, but values from 1 to 5 are generally considered reasonable. We choose
the commonly used value γ = 2, and likewise set ρ = .02. We examine the sensitivity of our
results to these choices for γ and ρ.
This leaves ﬁve unknowns: the economic variables c and i, the EIS ψ, and the two
parameters describing the characteristics of catastrophic shocks, λ and α. We have ﬁve
equations (14), (15), and (22) to (24), so the model is exactly identiﬁed. Also, because
we solve for ψ, we can assess the approximation of expected CRRA utility (the constraint
ψ = 1/γ) as a model of preferences.
Table 1 summarizes all of the inputs used in the baseline calibration, and the outputs.
The calibration yields a mean arrival rate λ of 0.0150, a value for the distributional parameter
α of 2.374, and a value for the EIS ψ of 0.181. This value of α implies that the mean loss
E(1 − Z) from a catastrophe is 29.6%. Also, the probability that the loss will be a fraction
L or greater, i.e., the probability that Z ≤ 1−L, is (1−L)α. Thus the probability that the
loss will be at least 25% is .752.374 = .51, at least 50% is .19, and at least 75% is .04. Finally,
note that the 1.5% mean arrival rate implies substantial risk; for example, the probability
that no catastrophe will occur over the next 50 years is only e−.015×50 = .47.
By comparison, Barro and Urs´ ua (2008) obtained higher values of λ. Using a sample of
1424 countries, they estimated λ as the proportion of years in which there was a contraction
of real per capital consumption of 10% or more, and for 36 countries, they based λ on
contractions of real GDP. They found λ to be 0.038 (for consumption and GDP). But for the
U.S. experience (which corresponds to our calibration), there were only two contractions of
consumption of 10% or more over 137 years (implying λ = 0.015), and ﬁve GDP contractions
(implying λ = 0.036). They also found an average contraction size (conditional on the 10%
threshold, and for the international sample) of 0.22 for consumption and 0.20 for GDP.
More recently, Barro and Jin (2009) independently applied the same power distribution
that we used in eqn. (20) to describe the size distribution for contractions. We obtained a
value of the distribution parameter α as an output of our calibration; they estimated α for
their sample of contractions. In our notation, their estimates of α were 6.27 for consumption
contractions and 6.86 for GDP, implying a mean loss of about 14% for consumption and 13%
for GDP.11 As we will see, these mean loss estimates, while smaller than ours, are consistent
with a larger value for the index of risk aversion γ, e.g., around 4 or 5 rather than 2.
Estimates of ψ in the literature vary considerably, ranging from the number we obtained
to values as high as 2.12 Our calibrated value of 0.181 is at the low end of the spectrum that
appears in the literature. As shown below, however, changing input parameters such as ρ or
γ in all cases result in values of ψ below 0.5, and the basic macro data are inconsistent with
values of ψ much above 0.5. In fact, as can be seen from eqn. (16), if one’s prior is that an
increase in the growth rate g should cause the MPC to rise, then ψ must be less than 1.
11Eqn. (20) is the distribution for Z, the fraction of the remaining capital stock. It implies that S = 1/Z
has the distribution fS(s) = αs−α−1. Barro and Jin (2009) use data on S, conditioned on S > 1.105, to
estimate α0 for the distribution fS(s) = α0s−α
0
. Thus α = α0 − 1.
12Bansal and Yaron (2004) argue that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is above unity and use 1.5
in their long-run risk model. Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) estimate the elasticity to be above unity
for stockholders, while Hall (1988), using aggregate consumption data, obtains an estimate near zero. Using
micro and macro evidence, Guvenen (2006) attempts to reconcile the diﬀerent estimates. He argues that
the elasticity depends on wealth, which is much less evenly distributed than consumption, so that estimates
based on aggregate consumption uncover the low of the majority of the population. Also, Yogo (2004) ﬁnds
that the EIS is less than unity and insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for eleven developed countries. He
argues that weak instruments signiﬁcantly aﬀect the identiﬁcation of the EIS through the linearized Euler
equation. The Appendix to Hall (2009) provides a brief survey of estimates in the literature.
15Table 2: Changes in Input Values
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, r = .008, c/i = 2.84, A = 0.113, rp = .066,
ρ = .02, γ = 2, σ = .025, g = .020, q = 1.43.
Cases ψ λ α E(1 − Z)
BASE CASE 0.181 0.0150 2.374 .296
ρ = .04 0.315 0.0150 2.374 .296
γ = 4 0.122 0.0266 4.983 .167
r = .012 0.320 0.0013 2.041 .329
q = 1.35 0.041 0.0288 2.638 .275
q = 1.50 0.291 0.0054 2.152 .317
3.3 Alternative Inputs.
One could argue that the values of some inputs, especially ρ and γ, should diﬀer from those
we used. As a robustness check, we re-calibrated the model with changes in various inputs.
The results are shown in Table 2. The ﬁrst row shows the baseline calibration corresponding
to the inputs in Table 1. Holding everything else constant in each case, we conduct the
following experiments: increasing ρ from .02 to .04, increasing γ from 2 to 4, increasing r
from .008 to .012, and changing q from 1.43 to 1.35 and 1.50.
As the table shows, our calibrated values for ψ are generally in the range of 0.1 to 0.3, and
for λ are between.005 and .030, a range that is relativelynarrow giventhat we are considering
rare events. The estimates of α and thus the expected loss, however, depend strongly on the
value of γ. Increasing γ to 4 causes α to approximately double, so that the expected loss
falls almost in half. (The expected loss of about 17% is closer to the 13% number that Barro
and Jin (2009) estimate.) The reason is that to be consistent with an equity risk premium
of 6.6%, more risk aversion requires a thinner tail for the loss distribution, so that there is
a lower probability of large losses (and thus smaller value of E(1 − Z)).
3.4 Catastrophic Insurance Premium.
Using eqn. (25), we can calculate the cost of insuring against any particular catastrophic
risk. For example, to insure against any catastrophe that results in losing a fraction L or
16more of capital stock (i.e., 1 − Z ≥ L), the required payment per unit of capital is
Z 1−L
0






α − γ + 1
#
. (26)
Thus the required payment per unit of capital to insure against any size catastrophe (L =
0) is λα[(α − γ)−1 − (α − γ + 1)−1]. Note that unlike the existing catastrophic insurance
literature, our model generates the insurance premium in a general equilibrium setting.
Using our baseline calibration (γ = 2, λ = .0150, and α = 2.374) and eqn. (26), we
ﬁnd the annual CIS payment to insure against any sized catastrophe to be .0693 per unit of
capital. We have A = .113, so the total annual cost of the insurance would be .0693Y/.113 =
.613Y , i.e., about 61% of GDP. How much of this large annual CIS payment reﬂects the
expected loss from a catastrophe and how much is a risk premium? We ﬁrst calculate the
expected loss with no risk premium. The implied actuarially fair annual CIS payment is
R 1−L
0 (1 − Z)λζ(Z)dZ, which can also be found by setting γ = 0 in eqn. (26).
Using our baseline parameters and insuring against all possible losses (L = 0), the actu-
arially fair annual payment is only .0044 per unit of capital, so that the average “price” is
.069/.0044 = 15.57 per unit of actuarially fair insurance. Of course, insuring against more
limited potential losses will have diﬀerent costs. For example, to insure against catastrophes
that generate a loss of 25% or more (i.e. L = 0.25), the actuarially fair premium is only
.0036 (because less insurance is purchased). However, the full annual payment only falls
from .0692 to .0679, so that the “price” for such insurance increases to .0679/.0036 = 19.0.
This insurance is more expensive because it is covering larger losses on average.
Table 3 summarizes both the CIS and actuarially fair payments to cover losses of diﬀerent
amounts for both γ = 2 and γ = 4. For a given level of risk aversion, the “price” of risk (the
ratio of the CIS payment to the actuarially fair premium) increases with L, the lower bound
of the loss fraction that is insured. For example, to insure only against catastrophes that
generate a loss of 75% or more (i.e. L = 0.75), the cost is .0527 per unit of capital while the
actuarially fair rate is only .0005, implying a price of risk of 115.
Note in Table 3 that because of the thinner tail (larger α), the actuarially fair premium
17Table 3: Loss Coverage and Components of Catastrophic Insurance Premia
γ = 2 γ = 4
Minimum loss covered, L CIS AF CIS/AF CIS AF CIS/AF
L = 0.00 (Full insurance) 0.0692 0.0044 15.57 0.0679 0.0044 15.29
L = 0.25 0.0679 0.0036 19.00 0.0638 0.0024 26.81
L = 0.50 0.0634 0.0019 33.82 0.0513 0.0005 104.53
L = 0.75 (75% or more losses) 0.0527 0.0005 114.77 0.0302 0.00002 1435.78
Note: For each amount of loss coverage, CIS is the required annual insurance payment and AF is
the actuarially fair payment. L = 0.50 means that only losses of 50% or more are covered.
is lower at all levels of L for γ = 4 than for γ = 2.13 However, the price of risk for larger
losses is much higher with more risk aversion. For example, to insure against catastrophes
with losses of 75% or more, the average price of insurance is 1,436 for γ = 4, compared to
115 for γ = 2. When only large losses are insured, greater risk aversion increases the cost of
insurance proportionally more relative to the actually fair price.
3.5 The Role of Adjustment Costs.
How important are adjustment costs? To address this question and do welfare calculations,
we must specify an adjustment cost function φ(i). We use a quadratic function, which can
be viewed as a second-order approximation to a more general one:
φ(i) = i −
1
2θi
2 − δ . (27)
In our baseline calibration, the resulting value of θ is 10.22, which is determined by eqn. (15):
q = 1/φ0(i) = 1/(1 − θi). In our baseline calibration, q = 1.43, i + c = A, and c/i = 2.84,
which pins down θ = 10.22.
To explore the role of adjustment costs, we ﬁrst reviewBarro’s (2009) results and then add
adjustment costs to his model. Based on historic “consumption disasters,” Barro estimated
13Note that the actuariallyfair premium for full insurance (L = 0) is 0.44%, which is independent of γ. The
total expected return on equity, r+rp, is the sum of three components: g+c/q−λE(1−Z) (see Appendix for
details). In our calibration, c/i = 2.84 and A = 0.113, implying c = 0.0836. Substituting q = 1.43, r = .008,
rp = 0.066 and g = 0.02 into the equation λE(1 − Z) = .02+ 0.0836/1.43− 0.008− 0.066 = 0.00044.
18Table 4: Effects of Adjustment Costs
(1) Barro (2009) Parameters: γ = 4, ψ = 2, ρ = .052, σ = .02, A = .174,
λ = .017, E(Z) = .71, E(Z1−γ) = 4.05, E(Z−γ) = 7.69
θ i c c/i r q g
0 0.126 0.048 0.381 .011 1.00 .025
4 0.062 0.112 1.806 -.025 1.33 -.046
8 0.038 0.136 3.579 -.036 1.43 -.068
12 0.027 0.147 5.512 -.041 1.47 -.078
20 0.017 0.157 9.234 -.045 1.51 -.087
(2) Our Parameters: γ = 2, ψ = 0.181, ρ = .02, σ = .025, A = .113,
λ = .015, E(Z) = .704, E(Z1−γ) = 1.723, E(Z−γ) = 6.348
θ i c c/i r q g
0 0.0303 0.0827 2.72 .038 1.00 .025
4 0.0300 0.0830 2.76 .026 1.14 .023
8 0.0297 0.0833 2.81 .014 1.31 .021
10.22 0.0294 0.0836 2.84 0.008 1.43 .020
20 0.0282 0.0848 3.00 -0.018 2.30 .015
λ to be .017. He set γ = 4, and using an empirical distribution for consumption declines,
estimated the three moments E(Z), E(Z1−γ), and E(Z−γ). He also set ψ = 2, ρ = .052,
σ = .02, and A = .174. (Recall that because there are no adjusment costs, only A − ρ can
be identiﬁed in Barro’s model.) As noted earlier, economists diﬀer in their views about ψ,
but a value of 2 is at the high end of the range that has appeared in the literature.
The ﬁrst row of the top panel of Table 4 shows this calibration of Barro’s model; there are
no adjustment costs so capital is assumed to be perfectly liquid and q = 1. The calibration
gives a sensible estimate of the risk-free rate r and risk premium rp, but yieldsa consumption-
investment ratio of only 0.38, whereas the actual ratio is about 3. The rest of the top
panel shows how the results change as the adjustment cost parameter θ in eqn. (27) is
increased. The experiment here is to hold the structural parameters for both preferences
and the technology ﬁxed, change only θ, and then re-solve for the new equilibrium price
and quantity allocations. First, as we increase θ, q increases because installed capital now
earns more rents. Investment becomes more costly (given q, investment is determined by
the marginal adjustment cost, i.e., q = 1/φ0(i)), so i falls and c = A − i increases. When
19θ = 8, both c/i and q roughly match the data. However, the real risk-free rate falls below
−3% and the growth rate falls to around −7%. Basically, given Barro’s parameter choices
(particularly ψ and ρ) along with the exogenous inputs for λ and the moments of Z, the
model cannot match all of the basic economic facts, even allowing for adjustment costs.
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows results using our baseline calibration, but varying
the value for θ. (The boldface row corresponds to our calibrated value of θ, 10.22.) As
θ increases, the cost of investing increases, so both r and g fall, and q increases because
installed capital earns greater rents than newly purchased capital. Our model can match
the data, but adjustment costs are crucial. Unlike the top panel, our model generates a low
EIS, consistent with realistic numbers for c/i and q, as well as r and g.
4 Policy Consequences.
We now turn to the last question raised in the ﬁrst paragraph of this paper: What is
society’s willingness to pay to reduce the probability or likely impact of catastrophic events?
Our measure of WTP is the maximum permanent consumption tax rate τ that society would
be willing to accept if the resulting stream of government revenue could ﬁnance whatever
activities would permanently reduce the mean arrival rate of a catastrophe.
4.1 Willingness to Pay.
We want to determine the eﬀect of a permanent consumption tax. Given investment It and
output Yt, households pay τ(Yt − It) to the government and consume the remainder:
Ct = (1 − τ)(Yt − It) . (28)
How large a tax would society accept to reduce λ to λ0? Households would be indiﬀerent
between (1) no tax and a likelihood of catastrophe λ and (2) paying a permanent tax at rate
τ to reduce the likelihood to λ0 < λ if and only if the following condition holds:
V (K;λ
0,τ) = V (K;λ,0) , (29)
20where V (K;λ,τ) is the representative household’s value function from eqn. (9) when con-
sumption is taxed at rate τ. In Appendix C, we show that this condition impliesthe following:
b(λ
0;τ) = (1 − τ)b(λ
0;0) = b(λ;0) , (30)
where b(λ;0) is the coeﬃcient in the value function with no tax and is given by eqn. (10).
Thus to reduce the likelihood of a catastrophe from λ to λ0, households would be willing to
pay a consumption tax at the following constant rate:
τ(λ,λ




For the household, a permanent tax at rate τ is equivalent to giving up a fraction τ of
the capital stock. This is because the tax is non-distortionary. The tax is proportional to
output, so households’ after-tax consumption is lowered by the same fraction as the tax
rate in all states and in all future periods. Thus households’ intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution, which determines the equilibrium pricing of risk, remains unchanged for any
given value of λ. (Note, however, that the equilibrium pricing and resource allocation depend
on λ, and thus will change when the government uses the tax proceeds to reduce λ.) Likewise,
the total value of capital (including the taxes paid to the government) is unchanged, and
investment is unchanged. A fraction τ of ownership is simply transfered from households
to the government. This key result follows from the recursive homothetic preferences and
equilibrium property that the economy is on a stochastic balanced growth path.14
4.2 Tax Calculations.
Table 5 shows the maximum permanent tax rate society would accept to reduce λ from its
starting value to .005 and to 0. The ﬁrst row applies to our baseline calibration, for which λ
is .0150 and the expected loss E(1−Z) is .2964. A tax rate of about 15% would be warranted
to reduce λ to 0, and a tax rate of about 11% would be warranted to reduce λ to .005, which
is about a third of its starting value.
14We focused on a tax used to reduce λ, but the results also apply if the tax is used to reduce the expected
impact of a catastrophic event. By substituting α in place of λ, eqn. (31) can be used to ﬁnd the maximum
tax rate households would accept to increase the impact distribution parameter from α to α0 > α. Note
from eqn. (21) that increasing α reduces the expected loss E(1 − Z) as well as the variance of the loss.
21Table 5: Tax Calculations
Note: A = .113, r = .008, c/i = 2.84, rp = .066, σ = .025, g = .020, q = 1.43
γ ρ λ E(1 − Z) λ0 = .005 λ0 = 0
2 .02 .0150 0.2964 τ∗ = 0.108 τ∗ = 0.152
2 .04 .0150 0.2964 0.110 0.156
4 .02 .0266 0.1671 0.150 0.176
4 .04 .0266 0.1671 0.153 0.181
Given that there is disagreement regarding the index of risk aversion γ and rate of time
preference ρ, we recalculated the tax rates for γ = 4 and ρ = .04. As Table 5 shows, changing
ρ has no eﬀect on λ and E(1−Z), and only a miniscule eﬀect on the tax rate τ∗. Increasing
γ results in an increase in λ, but a proportionate decrease in the expected loss E(1 − Z).
(The product λE(1−Z) is .0044 for either value of γ.) Thus the warranted tax rate to bring
λ to zero (for ρ = .02) increases, but only from 15% to 17.6%.15 Overall, our tax results are
quite robust to variations in γ and ρ.
What justiﬁes these tax rates, given that without a tax a catastrophe would occur only
every 67 years on average, and should it occur, the expected reduction of the capital stock
is about 30%? To answer this, we examine the welfare eﬀects of catastrophic risk. First, we
introduce the following risk-adjusted growth rate b g:












Note that b g depends on the index of risk aversion, γ, but not on the EIS ψ. It is the reduction
in the normal growth rate g due to continuous ﬂuctuations and sudden drops in K.
Now suppose there is no tax. Note that b(λ;0) is a welfare measure in terms of certainty
equivalent wealth, speciﬁcally the risk-adjusted beneﬁt from a unit of capital. We show in












15The tax to reduce λ to .005 increases by more, but when γ = 4 the proportional reduction in λ is larger.
22Consider what would happen if there were no tax but λ were 0 instead of .015, i.e.,
catastrophic risk was costlessly eliminated. Other than λ, the “new” economy has the
same structural parameter values as the old one, i.e., the preference parameters (ρ,γ,ψ) and
production parameters (A,σ,α,θ and δ) are the same as in our baseline calibration. However,
the equilibrium price and quantity allocations will be diﬀerent because of the diﬀerent values
of λ. In the new equilibrium, there will be less investment and more consumption; the
investment-capital ratio falls from 0.029 to 0.0196, and q falls from 1.43 to 1.25. The lower
precautionary demand for saving gives rise to a much higher interest rate; r increases from
.008 to .086. However, the risk premium falls dramatically from .066 to .00125, implying that
the expected return on equity only increases from 7.4% to 8.73%. Eliminating catastrophic
risk reduces the “normal” growth rate g from .020 to .013, but it increases the risk-adjusted
growth rate b g from .0085 to .0120. The overall welfare gain is captured by the change in b,
which is about 15%, the amount of the tax.
Eliminating or reducing catastrophic risk is fundamentally diﬀerent from purchasing in-
surance since the latter is a zero NPV ﬁnancial transaction, with no gain in value (at least
in an M-M world). Using tax proceeds to reduce λ is a more cost-eﬃcient way to manage
aggregate risk than purchasing insurance; it would be a positive NPV project and thus wel-
fare enhancing if it could be done at a cost lower than the WTP. For example, if λ could be
reduced to zero at an annual cost of only 7% of consumption, consumers would gain an 8%
increase in certainty equivalent consumption units. In this case, the marginal beneﬁt of a
reduction in catastrophic risk would clearly outweigh the marginal cost.
Note that our cost-beneﬁt analysis is a general equilibrium one, and is fundamentally
diﬀerent from the standard cost-beneﬁt approach in which an NPV is calculated treating
input prices and the cost of capital as exogenous. The standard approach is adequate for
evaluating the construction of a new bridge, because while the bridge involves a change in
cash ﬂows, there is no change in the cost of capital (i.e., the pricing kernel). But when the
“project” involves a major change in the economy (e.g., reducing or eliminating catastrophic
risk as in our model), prices as well as cash ﬂows change in the new equilibrium, so the
“project” can only be evaluated by comparing its cost to its WTP, as we have done above.
23Our model of a production economy with adjustment costs is a natural framework for general
equilibrium cost-beneﬁt analysis.
Our results have strong policy implications. A 15% tax on consumption is substantial,
but is justiﬁed if the resulting revenues could be used to completely or largely eliminate the
risk of a catastrophe. Naturally, the less costly it is to reduce catastrophic risk, the more
desirable it is for the government to intervene. Overall, our results provide quantitative
support to the claims by Posner (2004), Parson (2007), Sunstein (2007), Allison (2004) and
others that the risk of a national or global catastrophe is signiﬁcant, and governments should
devote greater resources to reducing that risk.
5 Conclusions.
We set out to ﬁnd the mean arrival rate and impact distribution of possible catastrophic
events that are national or global in scale. Rather than use historical data as others have
done, we calculated these event characteristics as calibration outputs from a general equi-
librium model. Our baseline estimate of the mean arrival rate is .015, but we ﬁnd that a
reasonable range is between .005 and .025. Our estimates of the impact distribution and
expected loss should a catastrophe occur depend on the index of risk aversion γ (which we
take to be between 2 and 4). However, the expected losses are large: 27% to 32% if γ = 2.
Our model provides a natural benchmark to quantitatively assess public policy; it fully
incorporates general equilibrium quantity and price adjustments by the private sector in
anticipation of a policy intervention. We calculated as a “willingness to pay” measure the
permanent tax on consumption that society would accept to reduce the annual probability
of a catastrophe. We ﬁnd that a tax of about 15% would be justiﬁed if the resulting revenues
could be used to reduce the probability to zero. An alternative to a tax is insurance, but we
have shown that the cost of insurance to cover a catastrophe of any size is very large. Using
tax revenues to eliminate or reduce the likelihood of a catastrophe is especially attractive if
the required revenue is less than the WTP, making the social NPV positive.
Our results also have implications for some of the behavioral parameters that are often
24used in macroeconomic and ﬁnancial modeling. In all cases the calibrations yield values for
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution that are well below 0.5. In addition, our results
are generally consistent with the view that restricting preferences to expected CRRA utility
is not a bad approximation for modeling purposes.
Some caveats are clearly in order. Our model is intentionally simple and stylized. For
example, we solved the social planner’s problem for a representativeﬁrm with an AK produc-
tion technology and adjustment costs, and a representative household with rational expecta-
tions. This is equivalent to a competitive equilibrium with a large number of identical ﬁrms
and identical households, with the same production technology and preferences, so that we
ignore heterogeneity among ﬁrms and households. We also characterize catastrophic events
in a simple way — a Poisson arrival with a constant mean arrival rate, and a permanent
impact that follows a one-parameter distribution. These simpliﬁcations, however, make the
model highly tractable, and provide an innovative approach to estimating the characteristics
and policy implications of possible catastrophic events.
25Appendix
A. Solution of Model.














Substituting (35) back into the HJB eqn. (7) yields eqn. (11) for the optimal i∗.





























Using the equilibrium relation between b and c∗, we can simplify the above as follows:















Using Ito’s lemma and the equilibrium allocation, we have
1
Mt−
dMt = −hdt − γ [φ(i










The equilibrium restriction that the expected rate of change of Mt must equal −rt implies
the following formula for the equilibrium interest rate:










Let Q(K) denote the value of the capital stock and q denote Tobin’s q. By homogeneity,
Q(K) = qK. The equilibrium dividend is then Dt = Ct for all t. The standard valuation
26methodology implies that MtDtdt + d(MtQt) has an instantaneous drift of zero. Using Ito’s




































where b g is deﬁned in (32). The expected rate of return on equity is then
r

















Therefore, the aggregate risk premium rp is given by
rp = r









B. Decentralized Market Solution.
Here, we provide the decentralized market equilibrium solution. First, we ﬁnd the rep-
resentative consumer’s optimal consumption, portfolio choice and CIS demand. Second, we
turn to ﬁrm value maximization taking prices as given. Finally, we conjecture and verify
equilibrium prices and resource allocation.
Consumer Optimality. Let X denote the consumer’s total marketable wealth and π
the fraction allocated to the market portfolio. For catastrophe with recovery fraction in
(Z,Z + dZ), ξt(Z)Xtdt gives the total demand for the CIS over time period (t,t + dt). The





We conjecture that the cum-dividend return of the market portfolio is given by
dQt + Dtdt
Qt−
= µdt + σdWt − (1 − Z)dJt , (47)
where µ is the expected return on the market portfolio (including dividends) but without
the eﬀects of catastrophic risk (and will be determined in equilibrium). When a catastrophe
occurs, the consumer’s wealth changes from Xt− to Xt as follows:
Xt = Xt− − (1 − Z)πt−Xt− + ξt−(Z)Xt− . (48)
The consumer’s wealth accumulation is then given by






Xt−dt + ξt−(Z)Xt−dJt − (1 − Z)πt−Xt−dJt .
27The ﬁrst four terms in (49) are standard in classic portfolio choice problems (with no insur-
ance or catastrophes). The last three terms capture the eﬀects of catastrophes on wealth
accumulation. The ﬁfth term is the total CIS premium paid before any catastrophe. The
sixth term gives the CIS payments by the seller to the buyer when a catastrophe occurs.
The last term is the loss of consumer wealth from exposure to the market portfolio.






















00(X) + λE [J(X − (1 − Z)πX + ξ(Z)X) − J(X)]
￿
. (50)
The FOCs for consumption C, market portfolio allocation as a fraction π of total wealth X,







00(X) + λE [(1 − Z)J
0(X − (1 − Z)πX + ξ(Z)X)] (52)
0 = −Xp(Z)J
0(X) + λX [J
0(X − (1 − Z)πX + ξ(Z)X)]fZ(Z). (53)
The last FOC follows from the point-by-point optimization in (50) for the CIS demand and






where u is a constant to be determined. Using the consumption FOC (51) and the conjectured




Imposing the equilibrium outcome in which (1) π = 1; (2) ξ(Z) = 0 for all Z; and (3) the
consumer’s wealth equals the total value of the market portfolio, X = Q, we obtain:
0 = (µ − r)J
0(Q) + σ
2QJ






































16In writing the HJB equation (7), we use the result that the “normalized” aggregator as deﬁned and
derived by Duﬃe and Epstein (1992) applies to our setting with both jumps and a diﬀusion. See Benzoni,
Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2010).
28Eqn. (55) implies c = ρψu1−ψq under the equilibrium condition X = Q = qK. Substi-


























Firm Value Maximization. We assume ﬁnancial markets are perfectly competitive
and M-M holds. While the ﬁrm can hold ﬁnancial positions (e.g., CIS contracts), equilibrium
pricing implies that there is no value in doing so. We can thus ignore ﬁnancial contracts and
only focus on investment I when maximizing ﬁrm value, which is independent of ﬁnancing.
Taking the unique stochastic discount factor (SDF) implied by the equilibrium consumption










subject to capital accumulation, the production technology, and the transversality condition.
Using the homogeneity property of our model, we conjecture that the SDF is given by a
geometric Brownian motion with constant drift, constant volatility and proportional jump
for each possible recovery fraction Z, i.e.













The second and the third terms capture diﬀusion and catastrophic risk respectively. Both
terms are martingales. Note that to make the catastrophe term a martingale, we must
subtract the expected change of M due to all possible catastrophes. Finally, the ﬁrst term
gives the equilibrium drift of M, which must be −rMt from the no-arbitrage condition.
No arbitrage implies the drift of Mt(AKt − It)dt + d(MtQt) is zero. From Ito’s Lemma










dt + σKQKdWt + (Q(ZK) − Q(K))dJt . (62)
Again using Ito’s Lemma, we have






















Mt−dt = 0. (63)



















29The FOC with respect to investment is therefore
1 = ΦI(I,K)QK . (65)
Using the homogeneity assumption, we conjecture that ﬁrm value is Q(K) = qK, where













The equilibrium dynamic for ﬁrm value Qt is then given by
dQt = gQt−dt + σQt−dWt − (1 − Z)Qt−dJt . (67)
where g = φ(i) is the expected growth without the eﬀects of catastrophes.





Market Equilibrium. We now verify that the conjectured prices and quantities are
consistent with equilibrium market outcomes, and replicate the six key equations (14)-(19)
in the text. First, eqn. (14) follows immediately from the goods market clearing condition,
Y = C + I, and the homogeneity property. Second, eqn. (15) is the FOC for the producer
under homogeneity. Third, we obtain eqn. (16) for consumption by comparing the dynamics
for ﬁrm value on the consumer and ﬁrm sides, (47) and (67), to obtain the restriction:




The expected rate of return (without catastrophes) is φ(i) plus the dividend yield, which is
also the consumption-wealth ratio. Substituting (69) into (59) gives eqn. (16).
Fourth, using the equilibrium consumption and evaluating the SDF via (36), we obtain
the equilibrium interest rate r given by (17) and the equilibrium market price of diﬀusion
risk η = γσ. Note that the implied interest rate is also consistent with eqn (66).
Fifth, simplifying (56), we have the following result:







Adding the expected loss due to the catastrophic risk, we obtain the following formula for
the equity risk premium rp:









which is eqn. (18). Finally, substituting (54) into (57) gives the CIS insurance premium
p(Z) of eqn. (19). We have veriﬁed that the conjectured equilibrium is indeed consistent
with the social planner’s solution.
30C. Consumption Tax.
When taxes are distortionary the standard welfare theorem argument no longer applies.
In our case, however, we will see that a permanent consumption tax is non-distortionary, so
the social planner’s solution again coincides with the competitive market equilibrium. We
thus proceed by solving the social planner’s problem.
With a tax, the ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) for consumption in the planner’s problem is
(1 − τ)fC(C,V ) = φ
0(i)V
0(K) . (72)
Consider a tax to reduce λ. We conjecture that V (K;λ,τ), the value function for given






where b(λ;τ) measures certainty-equivalent wealth (per unit of capital) when consumption is
permanently taxed at rate τ. Let V (K;λ,0) and b(λ;0) denote the corresponding quantities
in the absence of a tax as in Section2. Let c = (1−τ)(A−i) denote the after-tax consumption-








Substituting (74) for i = A − c/(1 − τ) into the Bellman eqn. (7) and simplifying, we can

































































= (1 − τ)b(λ;0),
31where the last equality follows from (10). We have shown that:
b(λ;τ) = (1 − τ)b(λ;0) . (78)
Note that b(λ;0) in eqn. (10) is evaluated at the equilibrium i∗ (without a tax). In this case,
the solution to eqn. (11) remains the same. That is, the aggregate investment-capital ratio,
aggregate output, and the aggregate capital stock all remain unchanged.
D. Data and Inputs to Calibration.
Unless otherwise indicated, National Income and Product data are from the Dept. of
Commerce (www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb), data on ﬁxed reproducible assets are from the
Federal Reserve’sFlow of Funds (www.federalreserve.gov/releases/), data on T-Bill rates and
the CPI are from the Federal Reserve, and returns on the S&P 500 are from Robert Shiller
(www.econ.yale.edu/˜ shiller). The data are for the period January 1947 to December 2008.
Inputs to the calibration are measured or calculated as follows. (All data and calculations
are in a spreadsheet available from the authors on request.)
Capital Stock. Our measure of the total capital stock KT has three components:
physical capital KP, human capital KH, and intangible capital held by ﬁrms KI. Physical
capital, from the Fed’s Flow of Funds data, consists of ﬁxed reproducible assets, including
those held by federal and state and local governments. To estimate the stock of human
capital, we use an approach suggested by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1998), and take the
wage premium (the average wage minus the minimum wage) to be the return to human
capital. We also assume that physical and human capital earn the same rate of return.
Thus the total annual return to human capital is the wage premium as a fraction of the
average wage (about .60 on average) times total compensation of employees. To get the
rate of return on physical capital, we use total capital income (corporate proﬁts including
the capital consumption adjustment, i.e., gross of depreciation, plus rental income, plus
proprietors’ income) as a fraction of the stock of physical capital. That rate of return
(about 7%) is used to capitalize the annual return to human capital.17 For the stock of
intangible capital, we use a weighted average of McGrattan and Prescott’s (2005) estimates
of the intangible capital stock as a fraction of GDP for 1960–69 and 1990–2001. The result
is KI = .68Y . Given annual values for KP, KH, and KI, we calculate annual values for
A = Y/KT and use the average value of A (0.121) as an input to our calibration.
Investment. We need total investment, inclusive of investment in intangible capital,
to measure the consumption-investment ratio C/I. In equilibrium, investment in intangible
capital is given by II = (δI + g)KI, where δI is the depreciation rate for intangible capital
17For comparison, we also calculated the stock of human capital using the results in Jones, Manuelli,
Siu, and Stacchetti (2005), who estimated investment in human capital as a fraction of GDP. Assuming the
depreciation rates for human and physical capital are the same, the equilibrium stocks will be in proportion
to the investment levels. We obtained similar results (to within 15%) for the stock of human capital.
32and g is the real GDP growth rate (.02). The BEA’s estimate of the depreciation rate on
R&D is 11%, but McGrattan and Prescott (2005) argue that this rate is too high for most
non-R&D intangible capital. McGrattan and Prescott (2010) estimate the depreciation rate
for intangible capital to be 8%, which is the rate we use. Thus II = .10KI = .068Y .18
Adding this to investment in physical capital yields a consumption-investment ratio of 2.84.
Tobin’s q. We use the ﬁrm-level estimates of q from Riddick and Whited (2010), which
are based on Compustat data for the period 1972 to 2006. Averaging their estimates across
ﬁrms and years yields a value of 1.43
Real Risk-Free Interest Rate and Equity Risk Premium. We use monthly data
on the nominal 3-month T-bill rate net of the percentage increase in the CPI for all items.
Averaging over the (annualized) monthly numbers yields r = 0.008. For the equity risk
premium, we use the monthly return (capital gain plus dividend) on the S&P500, compiled
by Shiller, and subtract the nominal 3-month T-bill rate. Averaging over the annualized
monthly numbers yields rp = 0.066.
Real GDP Growth Rate and Normal Volatility. We use real GDP and population
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to compute the annual growth rate of real
per-capita GDP. Averaging over these annual growth rates yields g = .020. Assuming no
catastrophes occurred during 1947 – 2008, our estimate of normal volatility is the sample
standard deviation of these annual growth rates, which is σ = .025.
18This is within the range of the Corrado et al. (2005) estimates of investment in intangible capital.
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